A new approach to the Vedas : an essay in translation and exegesis

A NEW APPROACH TO THE VEDAS

108 Not that either originates the other, but that neither can be without the other.

109 The theme is further developed in Aitareya Aranyaka, II, 1, 5, where satya is treated as threefold, just as the OM isa + u + m: here “ sat is Spirit, #i is Food (the means of being in a mode), and tya is yonder Supernal-Sun : that (satya) is triple.” The sentence following, which arouses Keith’s moral indignation (Attareya Aranyaka, 1909, p. 207, Note 8), is perfectly intelligible in the light of the concluding part of Brhadaranyaka Up., V, 5, 1, to be translated as follows : (1) “ Though he speaks amiss (mysa@), yet he speaks Truth (satya) who knows this Truthfulness of Truth (satyasya satyattvam),” and (2) “ The first and last syllables are Truth (satya), in the midst is the Untrue (anyta). This Untrue is comprehended on both sides by the Truth, so the Truth preponderates. The Untruth does not injure him who knoweth this.” Neither passage envisages an ethical problem of any sort: both are dealing with the metaphysically True and Untrue, Vidya and Avidya. He who understands that ‘‘ Brahman is all this,” that Multiplicity is merely the becoming, the middle term of the Unity, though he may (as indeed he must) use the language of empiricism, is not deceived, misled, or injured thereby, for he knows contingent things eternalwise, he is not really but only apparently a “‘ materialist,” all his “ facts ’’ are transformed by his understanding of them.

As for the moral crux apparently presented by passages such as Kausitaki Up., III, 1, see above, p.95. The jivanmukia, by hypothesis, having no motives, cannot be charged with good or evil purposes, “ such, indeed, do nothing for themselves,’’ Prem Sagar, Ch. XXXIV. Or according to Deussen’s “‘ acute and concise interpretation ’’ (Hume), ignored by Keith, “ Whoever has attained the knowledge of the Atman and his unity with it, and thereby has been delivered from the illusion of individual existence, his good and evil deeds come to nought: they are no longer his deeds, simply because he is no longer an individual ”” (Sechzig Upanisads des Veda, p. 144, Note 1).

It was also the view of Aristotle that he who surpasses his fellows beyond all comparison in virtue is a law to himself, and not to be judged by other laws. Perfection and morality are incommensurable terms. If any are alarmed by this proposition, let them reflect that this doctrine by no means excepts the Wayfarer from his obligations, “while we are on the way we are not there,” and that any man who claims to be a Comprehensor, or in a state of Grace, does so at his own peril. That there can be false prophets does not affect the doctrine as to the intrinsic form of Perfection » which form, by its very nature, must be inexpressible in terms of thesis and antithesis, good or evil.

Eckhart, “No law is given to the righteous, because he fulfils the law inwardly, and bears it in himself ’’ (Claud Field’s selected Sermons, P. 55); St. Augustine, “ Love God, and do what you will.”

On Perfection and Liberty, see Guénon, Les états multiples de I’ étre, 1932, Ch. XVIII, and L’homme et son devenir selon le vedanta, Chs. XXIV and XXVI. That should be compared with the whole of Brhadavanyaka Up., Il, 3, where for example, the quintessence or tincture (vasa) of the “‘yon”’ is said to be the Person inthe Sun. Cf. also Note 372.

no “ Anything known or born is an image,’’ Eckhart, I, 258. Ramanuja glosses marta by kathina, “ concrete.”

411 The usual implication of sth@ is ‘‘ to exist,” ie., as natural species, any ‘‘ thing’: nor is this at all inconsistent with Ramanuja’s

102

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