Nelson's history of the war. Vol. XI., The struggle for the Dvina, and the great invasion of Serbia

88 HISTORY OF THE WAR.

even in the case of an army equipped with every device of modern science.

Von Hindenburg was compelled to turn his attention to the northern: sector, the line of the Dvina from Riga to Dvinsk. . The motive as expounded to his troops was to win a vantage-point from which to launch an ‘attack “on -Petrograd in the spring. We may ‘safely assume that nothing was further from the thoughts of the veteran FieldMarshal. His aim was safety and comparative comfort during the dreary business of the winter campaign. If he could gain the line of the Dvina he would free himself from the medley of bogs and forests in which the German left wing was now entangled. He would have a strong defensive position, which could be held with fewer men. For it was becoming very clear that the transVistula venture had been a blunder. It had not won a decision, it had involved huge losses, and it promised endless troubles unless a front could be obtained which offered some reasonable ease to the holders. The right wing in Galicia was clamouring for reinforcements, the need in the West for more men was already great and might soon become urgent, and the Balkan campaign was a gamble which involved unknown liabilities. Accordingly von Hindenburg shifted his attack from his left centre to his left, and pushed against the Dvina—Iless as part of a calculated offensive than because he could not stay where he was, and Riga and Dvinsk, if they could be mastered, would appreciably alleviate his position.

At the beginning of October we must regard the German front in the East as made up of strong