Nelson's history of the war. Vol. XI., The struggle for the Dvina, and the great invasion of Serbia

I LT OW a Sag

32 HISTORY OF THE WAR. | the Western front. There we had successfull | embarked on a great offensive, an offensive es to succeed must continue without intermission till the enemy’s lines were broken. But if we took away sufficient troops to achieve anything in the Balkans, that offensive must be suspended ; and if we did not send an adequate force to the Near East it would be far wiser to send nothing. It was the worst kind of vicious circle.

Every military consideration pointed to a continuation of the Western offensive and the abstention from any further divergent adventures. Such in the end of September was the view of the French General Staff, and on gth October the British General Staff drafted a memorandum against the Salonika expedition, since it was then too late to help Serbia. This led to Sir Edward Carson’s resignation on 12th October, on the ground that we were not fulfilling our debt of honour. Next day M. Delcassé resigned for the opposite reason, believing that any expedition to the Balkans was indefensible. Of the two distinguished statesmen, M. Delcassé from a military point of view had the better argument. With far too few men, in a country where transport difficulties were great and demanded a complete re-equipment, we proposed to make a diversion on behalf of a gallant ally, whom no diversion could save. The true blow for the re-creation of Serbia could only be struck on the Western front.

But no war can be conducted solely by military science. There were reasons which made some offort on Serbia’s behalf, however belated, a political necessity. We had promised assistance to that